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ABSTRACT
The Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and several other states have recently proposed employer
tax credits as measures to fight high unemployment in their states. Such policies are also being considered at the federal level. The authors find that such policies, in fact, do little to increase aggregate demand, and instead only modestly reduce the after-tax cost of labor in an economy with high
unemployment, falling wages, and weak demand They suggest a more effective approach to creating jobs
in the states: increasing spending in labor-intensive sectors and programs that are matched by federal
funds, such as Medicaid. These expenditures would be particularly effective if they were financed through
temporary high-income tax increases.
INTRODUCTION
The Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and several other states have recently proposed employer
tax credits as measures to fight high unemployment in their states. Such policies are also being considered at the federal level.
These policies are not likely to have a substantial positive impact on employment generation, either at the
federal or state level. The obstacles to success for such measures at the state level are particularly high.
This is because balanced budget requirements and caps on the size of the credits effectively negate the
potential of state-level employer tax credits to create any jobs, even if the credits are otherwise welldesigned. For effectively fighting the recession and mass unemployment, the fact is that there is no substitute for effective countercyclical policies operating at the federal level. At the same time, states can
generate a small number of additional jobs by increasing spending in labor intensive sectors and on programs that bring in federal matching funds, particularly if they are willing to use temporary taxes on affluent households to finance the spending.
THE TAX CREDIT PROPOSALS
The Great Recession of 2008-09 has had severe repercussions on the livelihoods of tens of millions of
people throughout the United States. More than 8 million jobs have been lost since the nation fell into
recession in December 2007. Official unemployment stands today at 9.7 percent (February 2010), and
unemployment is expected to average 8.0 percent even in 2012, according the latest forecast by the
Congressional Budget Office. While the Obama administration’s $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act stimulus package has certainly helped, creating 2 million jobs since it was enacted in

early 2009, it was too small to address the full extent of the economic downturn. Further steps are
needed if we want to avoid high unemployment for years to come. 1

a. Federal policy
One of the notable recent policy ideas for generating job growth is the employer tax credit, proposed by
Tim Bartik, John Bishop and the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). In October 2009 Bartik and Bishop proposed a two-year $190 billion Job Creation Tax Credit (JCTC), which would refund 15% of any payroll taxes
incurred by added wage costs, whether due to new hires, increased hours, or increased wages. 2 According to Bartik and Bishop’s analysis, the JCTC would create 35 new jobs for every $1 million in tax credit
between 2010 and 2011, with the cost per job falling further if increased income tax payments and decreased public benefit receipt for newly employed workers are also taken into consideration.
In his February State of the Union Address, President Obama laid out a very similar proposal called the
“Small Business Jobs and Wages Tax Cut” (JWTC). The JWTC would refund $5,000 plus the employer’s
share of Social Security taxes (6.2 percent of payroll under $106,000) for new hires at expanding firms in
2010. 3 Because the President’s proposal was quite similar to the JCTC, economists at EPI concluded it
would have roughly the same impact on jobs. The version of the credit that emerged from the House and
Senate, however, provides only a credit of 6.2 percent of payroll costs for hiring long-term unemployed
workers in 2010, whether the firms actually expand or not. 4 Because of these key differences, Bartik estimates this version of tax credit would create only 15 jobs per $1 million in tax credits. 5

b. State policies
As the federal proposals have been working their way through the political process, several states have
also introduced versions of these jobs tax credits. Governor Patrick of Massachusetts is proposing a
$2,500 refundable tax credit for firms with fewer than 50 employees that hire full-time workers and keep
them employed for at least one year between April 2010 and April 2012. 6 The value of the credit is
capped at $50 million, and since it is refundable and based on withholding tax, the credit will still be
available to firms that generate no profit. 7
Governor Rell of Connecticut has made a somewhat similar proposal, an expansion of the “Jobs Creation
Tax Credit Program (JCTCP)” in Connecticut. 8 The JCTCP expansion provides $2,500 for each full-time
employee hired at firms with fewer than 25 employees. Because it is a non-refundable credit against
state corporate income tax liabilities, it applies only to profitable firms. It applies to hires that occur between January 2010 and December 2012, and is available to the firm for two years beyond the year of
the hire. 9 So, in practice the $10 million annual cap on the credit could cost the state up to $50 million.
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND LIMITS OF THE PROPOSALS
The basic economic rationale behind these proposals is that they would reduce the cost to employers of
hiring workers. If workers are less costly, employers will have greater incentive to employ them, and this
could cause firms to do more hiring. Governor Patrick, for example, claims that “this will encourage the
hiring of up to 20,000 people.” This estimate, however, is simply built by dividing the cap on the credit
($50 million) by the size of the credit ($2,500) and does not reflect any serious attempt to discern the
credit’s impact.
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In practice there is good reason to think the state-level credits will generate very little, if any, hiring of new
employees. Even the federal credits, which have advantages over the state-level credits, are unlikely to
generate as many jobs as are being projected. The state-level policies, with small credits, low caps and
the accompanying balanced budget requirements, will certainly perform far worse.
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF A FEDERAL CREDIT

a. The elasticity of labor demand
The amount of new employment generated by any federal tax credit is largely a function of the size of the
credit and how responsive employers are to temporary reductions in total compensation. In the EPI proposal, Bartik and Bishop use a measure of firms’ responsiveness –the ‘own-price elasticity of demand for
labor’– of 0.3; if compensation declines by 10 percent, firms will increase their demand for labor by 3 percent. This is the “best estimate” of the range of estimates of the long-run elasticity of the demand for labor
based on Daniel Hamermesh’s seminal work on labor demand. 10 In the short-run – more relevant in this
situation, given the temporary nature of the credit – the elasticity will be lower, however. And in a period of
particularly weak demand, employers will likely be even less responsive. Using an elasticity from the lower
end of Hammermesh’s range – 0.15 – the number of jobs per million dollars of credit falls from 35 to 18.
Estimating the JCTC job creation based on the lower (0.15) elasticity – 18 jobs per million dollars of credit
– generates results much closer to those in the recent Congressional Budget Office analysis of similar
employer tax credit proposals. 11 The CBO concludes that under any payroll tax cut proposal “most of the
money forgone by the government would go to reduce employers’ taxes for existing workers, so—per dollar of forgone revenues—the added incentive to increase employment and hours worked would be small.”
If the payroll tax cut were restricted to firms that were expanding payrolls, the CBO estimates that the policy would create between 8 and 18 full-time jobs per million dollars of credit.

b. Analogous and historical policy comparisons
It is unclear in the current economic environment how responsive firms would actually be to these sorts of
tax credits. With demand for goods and services seriously depressed, unemployment high and wages falling, it is not obvious that a tax credit for hiring would actually cause firms to expand their employment
and operations. Much of the interest in this type of tax credit, however, is based on the perceived success
of the 1977-78 New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC). Studies by Bishop (1981)and Perloff and Wachter (1979), as
well as surveys of small businesses (McEvitt, 1978) do provide some evidence that firms added jobs as a
result of the credit. 12
Yet there is also evidence suggesting caution in interpreting these findings. The new jobs identified by
these studies were based on the differences in employment gains between firms that knew about the
NJTC and those that did not. Firms that knew about the credit seemed to grow 3 percent faster than
those that did not (Perloff and Wachter, 1979). But these studies are unable to rule out the possibility
that firms knew about the credit because they were already planning to hire new workers.
Based on an extensive employer survey combined with the payroll records of Wisconsin firms, Tannenwald (1982) found that most firms with knowledge of the NJTC did not increase hiring, and that the implied own-price elasticity of the demand for labor in response to the policy was just 0.04. 13 Firms did not
hire because demand for their product simply did not warrant increased production. Tannenwald also
found that there were also important organizational and informational gaps. At many firms the people
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doing the hiring had little interaction with the people filing taxes, and the timeframe for hiring is often very
different than the timeframe for filing taxes.
Such weak employment impacts are consistent with observation of other policy interventions that affect
labor costs, in particular raising the minimum wage by modest amounts. The “consensus” view of labor
economists is that the demand for teenage labor falls one percent in response to an increase in the
minimum of 10 percent (an elasticity of 0.1), and many studies find the relationship is indistinguishable
from zero. 14

c. Federal policies and deficit financing
Federal policies that would reduce the payroll taxes of firms have the potential to increase net employment during a recession largely because the federal government can engage in deficit spending. In the
absence of this ability, gross job gains from the credit would be weighed against gross job losses from the
offsetting budget cuts or tax increases, resulting in a net change in employment much smaller than reported by EPI or the CBO, likely very close to zero. Whether that net increase is positive or negative would
depend on the responsiveness of the sectors benefiting from the tax credit and the labor intensity of the
sectors experiencing budget cuts.
LIMITATIONS OF STATE-LEVEL CREDITS
State-level impacts from similar policies are likely to be smaller than even the most limited expectations
at the national level. In their federal proposal, Bartik and Bishop note that state-level versions of these tax
credits will have little impact on jobs because they are likely to be poorly designed, and any employment
impacts will be undermined by state budget rules. For a new jobs tax credit to be effective, Bishop warns
that 1) it needs to be a significant share of labor costs; 2) it should not favor low-wage, high-turnover
firms, and; 3) there should not be a firm-level cap on the amount of credit that can be received. 15 By
these criteria, “poor design” is a factor in both Massachusetts’ and Connecticut’s proposals, which have
small credits, are restricted to small (high-turnover) firms, and have low caps on total amount of the
credit. And all states face balanced budget requirements which will force budget cuts or other tax increases to offset the revenue lost through the credit.
WASTED EFFORT – REWARDING ALREADY PLANNED EXPANSION
Even supporters of the federal credits acknowledge that many firms that were already planning on expanding would benefit from the credit. According to EPI’s own analysis, under the best-case scenario, for every
job created because of the EPI-proposed tax credit in 2010 and 2011, more than six other jobs that were
already going to be created would also benefit from the credit. This is arguably acceptable at the federal
level because these benefiting firms may in turn increase their demand for additional workers or other materials and equipment. 16 Moreover since the federal credit does not have a cap, the fact that these already-expanding firms take the credit does not exclude other firms from expanding because of the credit.
This is not the case with the state-level credits. By capping the value of the credit, it is possible that the full
amount budgeted for the credit could be consumed by firms that were already going to expand.
The credits would be available to any small firm adding net new full-time jobs in Massachusetts between
April 2010 and April 2012 and any small firm hiring workers in Connecticut between January 2010 and
December 2012. There is no way for the states to distinguish between jobs added because of the credit
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and those that would have been added anyway. This is a major problem for the state-level credits, since
even in a deep recession many firms expand employment and even more engage in replacement hiring.
The existing volume of hiring and expansion among small firms suggests that much, if not all, of the credit
could be absorbed by hiring that was already going to happen. Because the state credits are capped, only
20,000 Massachusetts jobs and 4,000 Connecticut jobs can claim the credit in a single year. The available data do not allow us to precisely compare recent hiring to the categories laid out in the Connecticut
and Massachusetts proposals, particularly the requirements for employment tenure and that the jobs
must be full-time. However, since eighty percent of all jobs are full-time and the job tenure of the typical
worker is four years, it remains quite possible, given the following data, to conclude that the current level
of hiring among small firms in Massachusetts and Connecticut will be sufficient to fully absorb the proposed employer tax credits.
In the second quarter of 2009, Massachusetts added approximately 47,000 jobs at expanding firms with
fewer than 50 employees and 19,000 jobs at newly created firms with fewer than 50 employees. 17 In
Connecticut 16,000 jobs were added at expanding firms with fewer than 20 employees and 6,900 jobs
were added at newly created firms with fewer than 20 employees. 18
Because of employment turnover and business closings, we cannot simply multiply quarterly gross job
gains figures by four to obtain annual estimates. Workers who are hired might later quit or be fired, and
firms that expand in one quarter might contract in the next. In general, however, for expanding firms of all
sizes, the level of gross job gains in a given quarter is usually two-thirds of the level of gross job gains
across an entire year (Table 1). For newly opened firms, the quarterly gross job gains are roughly one-third
of job gains over an entire year.
The volume of hiring – relevant here because the Connecticut credit is based on the number of full-time
hires, not firm expansion – is even greater. Between December 2007 and December 2009 (the most recent data) an average of 52,000 workers were hired each month in Connecticut, and in Massachusetts
monthly hiring averaged 98,000 workers (Figure 1). 19 In spite of all of this hiring, total employment declined steeply over this period because this is less hiring than takes place in an expansion, and because
layoffs rose. 20
Despite the approximations required by the data, a fairly conservative set of assumptions suggest that
the existing volume of hiring and expansions at small firms is sufficiently large to absorb the entire of
amount of the credits being proposed in Massachusetts and Connecticut. If 1) small firm expansion in
2010 and 2010 remained as low as levels in 2009, 2) quarterly gross jobs gains were 80 percent of annual gains at expanding firms and 65 percent at opening firms, and 3) only half of workers at small firms
work 35 hours or more per week, there would already be 44,000 jobs eligible for the credit in Massachusetts each year and 15,000 in Connecticut, even without the credit. This is more than enough to absorb
all of the budgeted credits in both states. Since the credits are available first-come-first-serve and even
more gross job creation is expected in 2010 and 2011, there may be no credit available for firms who
might actually expand because of the credits’ existence. Knowing this might serve as a major obstacle for
firms contemplating creating jobs based on the expected benefit of the credit.
FURTHER LIMITATIONS OF SMALL CREDITS AND THE FOCUS ON SMALL FIRMS
Facing depressed demand and considerable economic uncertainty, employers are likely to require relatively generous subsidies before expanding payrolls. To the extent that the NJTC of the late 1970s was
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successful, it was because the $2,100 credit was equal to 22 percent of a typical full-time worker’s annual earnings. 21 An equivalent credit in 2009 would be worth nearly $12,000. Today, in Bishop’s estimation, a tax credit needs to be “larger than $3,000 to grab the attention of employers,” and ideally it would
be more than twice that amount. At $2,500, the credits offered by Massachusetts and Connecticut are
most likely to be insufficient to grab the attention of employers.
The CBO also notes that restricting the credit to benefit only small firms will further reduce the impact on
jobs, because employment at small firms is especially volatile. Given their higher-than-average volume of
hiring and turnover, directing the credit at small firms would exacerbate the tendency of the program to
reward job creation that would have occurred anyway. The CBO found that limiting the credit to firms with
fewer than 100 employees would result in five to ten percent less job growth per dollar spent on a federal
credit than opening it to all firms. 22 If states restrict their credits to even smaller firms (50 employees in
Massachusetts and 25 in Connecticut), the job impacts will be even smaller.
REMAINING POTENTIAL FOR GAMING THE CREDITS
Since the proposed credits in Massachusetts and Connecticut would be available to firms of any organizational form and do not reward transferring employees between sites or related businesses of a corporation,
they circumvent some of the more obvious ways a firm might “game” the system. Despite these safeguards, the Massachusetts proposal does leave open one unintended consequence. Because the baseline
for measuring employment growth is March 31st 2010, it would be possible for firms to lay off workers in
advance of the March 31st cutoff and re-hire them in April. Given the costs of making this adjustment in
terms of worker morale and lost output and the relatively small size of the credit, it is unlikely that firms
would actually try to game the system in this way. But this only underscores the fact that the small size of
the credit makes it unlikely that employers are likely to actually create jobs because of the credit.
The proposal in Connecticut contains a similar loophole, giving firms the incentive for very short-term hiring. To be eligible for the credit, hires must be employed during, but cannot have been hired in, the last
month of the year. So, firms that hire a worker in November 2010 and fire them in January 2011 will be
eligible for the full $2,500 tax credit.
THE REALITY OF BALANCED BUDGETS
Massachusetts and Connecticut, along with all states except for Vermont, have balanced budget requirements. Therefore any expenditures on these tax credits will need to be offset by budget cuts or other
tax increases, effectively undermining any stimulative effect of the credit. In fact, the loss in employment
(both public and private sector) from budget cuts used to finance the employer tax credits would almost
certainly be greater than the number of jobs added due to the tax credits. Each million dollars of acrossthe-board reductions in state government spending would eliminate more than 18 jobs in each state; $50
million in reduced spending would eliminate 938 jobs in Massachusetts, and $10 million in reduced
spending would eliminate 185 in Connecticut (see Table 2). 23 These job losses would impact state employees laid off due to the cuts, private sector employees at firms losing contracts with the state, and
other private sector workers at companies where business drops off due to reduced customer spending.
These combined job losses offset the job gains estimated by most of the analyses of even the federal
employer tax credits.
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THE TIMING OF THE CREDITS
Because of the timing of the proposed credits, the current state budgets will not be affected by their
adoption. In Massachusetts no credits will be paid until April 2012, even for hires that are made as early
as April 2010. In Connecticut, the non-refundable credits can be used in the following tax year. The intent
of this design is to give firms an incentive to hire now, when the economy is bad, while allowing state governments to defer the costs for another budget cycle. One of the problems with this approach is that state
budgets are expected to face serious shortfalls for several years. The costs incurred by these employer
tax credits will lead to real budget cuts and job losses in two or three years. A second problem with delaying the credits is that having to wait so long – up to two years in Massachusetts – to receive the credit
makes it much less attractive to small firms that are struggling with cash flow in the current economic
environment.
THERE IS ONLY ONE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
BUT STATES DO HAVE BETTER OPTIONS THAN EMPLOYER TAX CREDITS
Given the small size of the credit, the existing volume of hiring and expansion at small firms, and the fact
the states will have to cut spending in other areas, we cannot expect these credits to create jobs. Given
the failure of the U.S. Senate to implement an effective second round of economic stimulus, states may
despair of any productive policy solutions. But while there are no substitutes for federal action, there are
more productive routes than these employer tax credits.

a. Education spending
By shifting existing spending to more labor-intensive areas or toward programs that draw in matching
federal dollars, states can create new jobs. Education generally and early childhood education in particular are two labor-intensive sectors where state spending could generate additional job growth. In Massachusetts, 27 jobs are created per million dollars of education spending; in Connecticut, the same funding
creates 25.5 jobs. Early childhood education spending is even more effective, creating 30 and 33 jobs
per million dollars in spending, respectively. Shifting $50 million of the general state budget into education (including K-12, vocational, and higher education) would generate 413 additional jobs in Massachusetts; a comparable shift of $10 million in Connecticut would create 70 jobs (Table 1). Shifting spending
toward early childhood education alone (including daycare centers, Headstart, and preschool) would create 560 jobs in Massachusetts and 148 in Connecticut.

b. Healthcare spending
While healthcare is not as labor intensive as education or early childhood education – as shown by the
jobs per million dollars figures in Table 2 – healthcare spending by state governments does bring in additional federal dollars to the state. State Medicaid spending has a nearly 62 percent matching rate for
2010 in both Massachusetts and Connecticut; the federal government finances 62 cents of every dollar
of Medicaid spending undertaken by the state. Thus a $50 million increase in spending by the state leverages $82 million in additional federal dollars, for a combined $132 million. As a result, $50 million in
increased Medicaid spending by Massachusetts would create 1,414 jobs, and $10 million in spending
would create 271 jobs in Connecticut.

c. Infrastructure spending
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Because it is relatively capital intensive, spending on infrastructure projects will not create as many jobs
as spending in these other sectors, at least in the short run. In the absence of matching funds, shifting
existing spending toward infrastructure projects would actually result in a decline in jobs in Massachusetts and Connecticut. The inherent value of infrastructure projects in a recession is that they enhance
the long-term productivity of the state’s economy, and do so utilizing the labor and equipment of sectors
that are disproportionately impacted in downturn. However, infrastructure projects frequent generate
federal or private matching funds. If infrastructure investments were accompanied by significant matching funds (close to 40 percent of total costs), they would then generate additional employment beyond
the existing pattern of state government spending.

d. Financing state spending
If states financed this additional spending by raising taxes on affluent households instead of simply shifting spending out of other areas, they could create a somewhat greater number of new jobs. Since lowincome households generally spend nearly every dollar they earn, additional taxes on those households
reduce consumer spending dollar for dollar. Affluent households, however, save considerable portions of
their incomes; temporary tax increases on those households would reduce spending somewhat, but much
less than dollar for dollar. 24 Conservative estimates from research on consumer responses to changes in
income and social security taxes suggest that affluent households might reduce their consumption by up
to half of the amount of a temporary tax increase. 25
If additional spending on education and healthcare is financed by temporary taxes on high-income
households (with incomes above $150,000), the impact on job creation will be somewhat greater than if
the spending is based on simply shifts the existing budget. Financed in this way, spending $50 million in
Massachusetts would generate 2,096 jobs in the health care sector, 1,096 jobs in education, 1,243 jobs
in early childhood education, or 347 jobs in infrastructure. Spending $10 million in Connecticut would
produce 409 jobs in the health care sector, 208 jobs in education, 286 jobs in early childhood education,
or 69 jobs in infrastructure.
CONCLUSION
Since they do little to increase aggregate demand, and instead only modestly reduce the after-tax cost of
labor in an economy with high unemployment, falling wages, and weak demand, even the federal employer tax credit proposals should not be expected to dramatically increase employment. Because the
state proposals are small, targeted to small firms, and capped at relatively low levels they can be expected to generate little, if any, gross job gains. The credits are not generous enough to motivate firms
that weren’t already planning on hiring to do so, and will possibly be entirely consumed by the existing
volume of hiring and expansion at small firms. Since the state credits have to be financed under a balanced budget, they cannot be expected to cause net increases in employment. The job losses resulting
from decreased state spending will almost certainly outstrip the number of jobs created by the credits. A
more effective approach to creating jobs in the states would be to increase spending in labor-intensive
sectors and programs that are matched by federal funds, such as Medicaid. These expenditures would be
particularly effective if they were financed through temporary high-income tax increases.
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Table 1. Quarterly and Annual Gross Job Gains in Massachusetts and Connecticut, All Firm Sizes

Annual Gross Job Gains (Over the 12‐month period
ending in the 1st Quarter)
Connecticut

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

At
Expanding
firms
113,354
117,374
109,188
133,943
128,349
129,906
126,870
119,213
105,199
88,351
100,883
101,986
102,740
102,231
104,292
77,656

At
Opening
Firms
52,286
55,992
57,761
65,751
56,298
55,916
52,941
45,676
47,188
39,260
37,022
39,920
36,810
36,501
33,749
28,989

Massachusetts
At
At
Expanding
Opening
firms
Firms
207,478
102,411
227,401
105,661
223,640
104,134
235,949
116,948
244,150
109,312
240,505
119,361
265,811
118,219
274,926
109,342
209,823
90,028
187,661
88,921
192,228
73,375
189,690
80,933
206,581
74,240
201,199
73,782
196,149
74,193
151,141
57,709

Quarterly Job Gains (In the First Quarter)
Connecticut
At
At
Expanding Opening
firms
Firms
69,093
16,678
75,412
15,961
78,283
18,392
91,277
16,379
85,935
17,043
86,965
16,977
87,458
19,850
75,804
16,521
72,563
12,774
61,779
11,814
69,043
14,575
66,652
16,714
69,088
11,035
65,705
12,178
68,268
9,096
53,746
8,609

Massachusetts
At
At
Expanding
Opening
firms
Firms
128,569
32,437
148,509
40,770
144,227
38,393
157,014
37,448
153,543
42,538
159,660
41,991
177,441
38,156
171,513
37,450
149,238
40,685
132,152
37,932
137,588
31,286
127,609
35,113
131,672
28,234
129,828
30,551
129,180
30,751
98,552
22,806

Source: PERI analysis of BLS Business Employment Dynamics data.
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Quarterly gains as Share of Annual Gains
Connecticut
At
At
Expanding
Opening
firms
Firms
61%
32%
64%
29%
72%
32%
68%
25%
67%
30%
67%
30%
69%
37%
64%
36%
69%
27%
70%
30%
68%
39%
65%
42%
67%
30%
64%
33%
65%
27%
69%
30%

Massachusetts
At
At
Expanding
Opening
firms
Firms
62%
32%
65%
39%
64%
37%
67%
32%
63%
39%
66%
35%
67%
32%
62%
34%
71%
45%
70%
43%
72%
43%
67%
43%
64%
38%
65%
41%
66%
41%
65%
40%

Table 2. State Spending Multipliers: Alternatives to the Payroll Tax Rebate
Massachusetts ($50 million credit)

Healthcare
Education
ChildCare
SL investment

Funding level
($million)
130
50
50
50

Total jobs,
funding level
2,352
1,351
1,498
602

Net Employment Effects ‐ Massachusetts

Total jobs per Direct jobs per Indirect jobs Induced jobs
$1 million
$1 million
per $1 million per $1 million
18.06
11
1.9
5.16
27.02
17.2
2.1
7.72
29.96
19.4
2
8.56
12.04
6.7
1.9
3.44

Net Jobs, shift in
state spending
1,414
413
560
‐336

Connecticut ($10 million credit)

Healthcare
Education
ChildCare
SL investment

Funding level
($million)
26
10
10
10

Total jobs,
funding level
456
255
333
116

Personal
Consumption
Net Jobs, increased State Spending and
(Households
taxes on upper
Investment (total $150k+), jobs per $1
income brackets jobs per $1 million)
million*
2,096
18.76
10.22
1,096
18.76
10.22
1,243
18.76
10.22
347
18.76
10.22
Net Employment Effects ‐ Connecticut

Total jobs per Direct jobs per Indirect jobs Induced jobs
$1 million
$1 million
per $1 million per $1 million
17.5
10.7
1.8
5
25.48
16.2
2
7.28
33.32
21.9
1.9
9.52
11.62
6.6
1.7
3.32

Net Jobs, shift in
state spending
271
70
148
‐69

Personal
Consumption
Net Jobs, increased State Spending and
(Households
taxes on upper
Investment (total $150k+), jobs per $1
income brackets jobs per $1 million)
million*
409
18.48
9.38
208
18.48
9.38
286
18.48
9.38
69
18.48
9.38

Source: PERI and IMPLAN 2007
Notes:
Healthcare includes matching funds from fed govt at rate of 0.616 fed dollars for each state dollar
Education includes primary, secondary, college/university, and other (such as trade schools)
ChildCare includes daycare centers, home care, headstart, pre‐school, and other modes of child care
State and Local investment includes infrastructure spending on buildings, roads, computer equipment, etc.
*For households >$150k, fall in personal consumption is 50% total tax increase. This assumes symmetry between tax rebate and tax increase consumption effects.

G EN ERAT IN G JOBS T HRO OUG H EM PO LO YER T AX CR ED ITS : IS T H ER E A BE TTE R W AY ?

/ Thompson & Garrett-Peltier / page 11
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